"What Kine Hawaiian Are You?" A Mo'olelo about Nationhood, Race, History, and the Contemporary Sovereignty Movement in Hawai'i by Osorio, Jonathan Kamakawiwo'ole
On 23 February 2000, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Rice
versus Cayetano that the ancestry qualification for voters of the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs was unconstitutional because it violated the Fifteenth
Amendment of the US Constitution.Although a politically narrow ruling,
the court dispensed with one of the agency ’s most significant political func-
t i o n s , namely, acting as a form of self-government for over two hundred
thousand Hawaiians in the islands, while temporarily at least sustaining
that agency’s continued function of dispensing funds and services to
Native Hawaiians. The significance of the ruling depends on one’s point
of view. There is no unqualified Hawaiian perspective on this issue, partly
because of the history of Hawaiian sovereignty in Hawai‘i and partly
because of the perplexities among Hawaiian Natives and residents about
race, nationality, and culture.
In the past thirty years cultural theory has helped to create a kind of aca-
demic uncertainty about the functions and nature of culture. From Geertz
and his thick descriptions to articulation theories in the past decade, the
disciplines of culture have steadily moved from a kind of fixed position
in which the ethnologist knows and observes the ethnographic subject, to
a much more fluid and dynamic study in which every participant, eth-
nologist, Native subject, and even the study itself evolves and changes as
a result of their interaction with each other.
There is an existing metaphor for this process in the emergence of
Hawaiian studies at the University of Hawai‘i. Those of us who teach and
359
The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 13, Number 2, Fall 2001, 359–379
© 2001 by University of Hawai‘i Press
“What Kine Hawaiian Are You?” 
A M o ‘ o l e l o about Nationhood, Race,
H i s t o ry, and the Contemporary
S o v e reignty Movement in Hawai‘i
Jonathan Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio
360 the con t e mpor a ry pacific • fall 2001
research the Native point of view are also participants on one level or
another in the political sovereignty movement, in the movement to revi-
talize our Native culture and language, or both. Thus, any history that we
tell, whether it comes from the oral traditions that are centuries old, from
the published accounts of nineteenth- and twentieth-century writers, or
even from the correspondence and editorials of contemporary scholar-
activists, is not merely informational, but carries an activist content. The
stories are meant to persuade and motivate, but they are also meant to
explain our lives. These stories are all mo‘ o l e l o , whether they tell of mythic
beings, of “real” individuals whose power and influence affected the soci-
ety in which they lived, of personal occurrences and family stories, and
whether remembered in the mind or committed to writing. In mo‘olelo,
the teller has the obligation as well as the right to be critical, to make
pointed judgments of the subjects, to mock and anoint them, and even to
claim a special knowledge of the subject that makes a particular mo‘olelo
worth heeding. 
Such assertive scholarship can be traced from the writings of mid-nine-
teenth-century historians like David Malo and Samuel Kamakau to con-
temporary scholars like Lilikal Kame‘eleihiwa and Haunani-Kay Trask
at the Center for Hawaiian Studies. Over more than a century, all of these
writers have described the Hawaiian nation, the lhui, struggling to sur-
vive in the wake of disease and large-scale social change that the arrival
of haole (Europeans and Americans) wrought in the islands. Despite
significant differences in the political outlooks of the mission-taught
Kamakau and the mission critic Kame‘eleihiwa, for instance, they both
glorify important aspects of the ancient culture and comment unfavor-
ably on the changes brought by haole law. Kamakau, a member of the
House of Representatives in the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, made these salient
remarks in 1867: “The truth was, they were laws to change the old laws
of the natives of the land and cause them to lick ti leaves like the dogs and
gnaw bones thrown at the foot of strangers, while the strangers became
their lords, and the hands and voices of strangers were raised over those
of the native race. The commoners knew this and one and all expressed
their disapproval” (Kamakau 1992, 399).
Where contemporary Native scholars have called for a renewal of
Hawaiian commitment to traditional values such as love and responsibil-
ity for the ‘ina (land), nonnative writers and politicians have responded
with skepticism. Anthropologist Jocelyn Linnekin labeled one such cul-
tural imperative Aloha ‘ina (cherishing land), an invented tradition of
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land stewardship (1983, 251–253). More recently, Honolulu magazine
writer Bob Rees specifically criticized several Hawaiian Studies professors
for teaching what he called “therapeutic history,” that is, history that is
more concerned with polemical battles than with fact (1996). 
Neither of these claims went unchallenged. Both Linnekin and Rees
were the subject of scornful rebuttals, which, among other things, chal-
lenged the qualifications of these haole writers to speak about either
Hawaiian culture or Hawaiian history (Trask 1999, 128). Issues of race
and culture have been a defining part of the controversy that swirls about
Hawaiian academia, where even Governor Benjamin Cayetano has called
on the university to counter the “revisionist history” being taught at the
University of Hawai‘i saying, “Knowing Haunani (Trask) and some of the
people up there, I think they have been teaching history which fits their
particular view of things” (Asato 2000, 1).
If the governor were honest he would acknowledge that his remarks
could hardly be taken for those of someone who is merely interested in
education and scholarship. There are huge political stakes in Hawai‘i that
hinge on Hawaiian sovereignty, land claims, and federal and state laws,
that make the study of such things tremendously important to the politi-
cal powers in these islands. In the face of ominous political winds, we
Hawaiians find ourselves having to navigate enigmatic and paradoxical
cognitive terrains of nationalism and race, which tend to diffuse and dis-
able our political movement for sovereignty while confounding our
attempts to define and assert ourselves. 
Nevertheless, the broad-based interest in the history, culture, language,
and environment of Hawai‘i, especially among a growing body of Native
scholars, suggests a concern for more than political positioning. In this
paper, I hope to demonstrate that identity (who we think we are) is the
foundation on which Native cultural studies is based. No other question
is as important to us, and no other question is so seriously contested by
others.
It is generally agreed that Hawaiians1 are an ethnic group, today com-
prising the descendants of the people who settled the Hawaiian Islands
before the first Europeans arrived. Hawaiians are thus defined by ances-
try, which is an important place of origin in any discussion of Hawaiian
identity. For if being a descendant of a Native makes one Native, what if
anything does blood quantum have to do with who we are? Does the
dilution of Hawaiian ancestry in any significant way change the ethnicity
of the individual? 
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Usually, the argument that someone of a smaller blood quantum is not
entirely Hawaiian is offered up by people who are not themselves Hawai-
ian. Not once in my life has any Hawaiian ever said or even hinted to me
that my being less than full-blooded made me any less Hawaiian. On the
other hand, the fact that I rarely use Pidgin English is much more of an
identity issue to those Hawaiians who speak Pidgin regularly. And I can
still remember times when, after refusing certain kinds of foods, such as
ake (liver) or ‘ulu (breadfruit), being asked, “You no eat ‘ulu? What kine
Hawaiian are you?”
At least for Natives today, our attachments to culture are indications
of our identity as significant as ancestry, although ancestry—that is, some
kind of Hawaiian blood, however minute—is also a necessary precondi-
tion to being Hawaiian.2 Questions of blood quantum (how much Hawai-
ian) may be raised between Hawaiians, but usually from curiosity and, in
polite conversation, not as an issue with political implications. 
However, because of the nature of the history of Native entitlements in
Hawai‘i, from the Hawaiian Homes Act of 1921 to the Office of Hawai-
ian Affairs, blood quantum is a legal issue, and so for Americans, an issue
that may be discussed without regard for privacy or politeness.3 Occa-
sionally, haole have asked about my blood quantum wondering why I
identify as a Hawaiian and not as Portuguese, Chinese, or German. I usu-
ally answer by saying that both my parents had Hawaiian blood, but the
simple truth is that I was identified as a Hawaiian by every institution that
had anything to do with my rearing: family, church, school (especially
teachers), and other children in the all-Hawaiian community in which I
grew up. Such questions used to strike me as expressions of curiosity,
though these days there is a fairly strong institutional and political inter-
est in Hawaiian blood quantum, which makes the question less innocent.
Americans have become more assertive that blood quantum matters
with regard to Native Americans because long-standing political arrange-
ments between Native nations and the United States have led to a system
of financial entitlements, political autonomy, and land control for a host
of Native tribes in America. Such arrangements rub some Americans the
wrong way, because they believe that there is a part of the Native Amer-
ican community with the smallest blood quantum of, say, Cherokee or
Lakota—hardly Natives at all, in their opinion—who nevertheless have
distinct rights and privileges. In other words, being Native in America is
an opportunity, as though those who claim such ancestry would proba-
bly not bother if political and financial advantages were not involved.4
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Caucasians in the United States may find it politically advantageous to
raise the ideological standard of “equal treatment” under the law when
they find themselves the objects of discrimination, however small. I
remember listening to several white men in Anchorage telling me how
unfair it is that Native Alaskans have much greater access to salmon
fishing, hunting, and gathering under subsistence rights than they do,
even while “everyone knows” that they are engaging in commerce as well
as subsistence. The entitlement was little more than an inconvenience for
these men, but seemed to have a greater impact just because it was under-
stood as discrimination against them. 
In Hawai‘i the economics are, perhaps, more critical for h a o l e who con-
tend that Native entitlements like the Hawaiian Homes Act, the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs, and even the private trust of the Kamehameha Schools
unconstitutionally or unfairly entitles a portion of the state’s citizenry on
the basis of race. In a place where over half of the land is held or contro l l e d
by the federal and state governments and fee-simple ownership is rare and
expensive, it is hardly surprising that Americans, unaccustomed to having
their opportunities limited, would question the land entitlements of Native
Hawaiians.
But even if being Native in Hawai‘i today is an opportunity of sort s ,
race, for Americans, has been the principal justification for their seizure of
wealth, power, and land in Hawai‘i and for the maintenance of incre d i b l e
privileges as long as they have been in the islands. J K  h a u l a n i K a u a n u i
gave a provocative analysis of the “blood quantum debates” in Congre s s
prior to the passage of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act in 1921.
Her a rticle “‘For Get’ Hawaiian Entitlements,” discusses how legislation
came to distinguish Hawaiians of 50 p e rcent blood quantum as a “benefi-
c i a ry class” after first sidestepping the issue that Hawaiians actually had
rights to the lands from which the benefits would come. She wrote, “In the
common sense of U.S. hegemony ‘returning Hawaiians to the land’ thus
e ffaced the alternative of re t u rning the land to Hawaiians” (1999 , 1 29). At
the same time as it established the blood quantum requirement that
reduced the number of potential beneficiaries, it also defined those with
more Hawaiian blood as those less assimilated, less American, and there-
fore more incompetent. Such efficient twining of political ideology and
effect!
Kauanui’s analysis is compelling, and follows in the theoretical foot-
prints of writers like Barbara Fields, who argued that race is an ideolog-
ical construct and therefore a historical product (1990, 101). To be sure,
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race consciousness has been a product of a particular history in America,
or as Fields put it, “American racial ideology is as original an invention
of the Founders as is the United States itself” (1982, 150). American race
ideologies have been malleable and well suited to changing political and
economic circumstances, as most ideologies are. Nevertheless, even if race
were no more than an assigned social criterion, we would do well to
examine the point of view of Native Peoples who have consistently arg u e d
that ancestry and blood matter in the complex adoptions of culture and
identity.
Being Hawaiian was important to Natives regardless of the fact that
until the past twenty years there were scarcely any political or economic
advantages tied to identifying oneself as Native. The Hawaiian Homes
Act, passed by Congress in 1921, did promise house and farm lots to indi-
viduals of 50 percent blood quantum or more, but within thirty years the
Act and the commission that administered it had become a grim joke
among Hawaiians, who acknowledged that the waiting list for a home-
stead was as long as decades, and that the awardees were either lottery-
fortunate or politically connected (Faludi 1990).
The cruel history of this program notwithstanding, a small, vocal, and
highly publicized group of individuals, most of them haole, has criticized
all the so-called entitlement programs, even the Hawaiian Homes Act, as
“affirmative action programs” that unfairly dole out revenues, resources,
and political rights to “minorities.” Couched in the language of contem-
porary Republicanism they present affirmative action as a racist institu-
tion, no more appropriate to America than the Jim Crow laws of the
nineteenth century.
Few Hawaiians have been beguiled by this argument, mostly because
attacks on our culture and our nation by a small minority of haole have
such a long history. Yet the attacks themselves miss some important points
about the trusts. One is that Hawaiians think they are deserved, whether
they, individually, are beneficiaries or not. More important, despite a cen-
tury of American education, and the prevalence of American cultural val-
ues in our society, many of us knaka continue to see ourselves as a lhui,
a distinct nationality that we have every right to maintain. 
The oldest and, I believe, still largest Native initiative for sovereignty
is Ka Lhui Hawai‘i, an organization whose constitution acknowledges
the problems of blood quantum while insisting that a trace of Hawaiian
ancestry is necessary for full citizenship in the nation-within-a-nation
government. Half of Ka Lhui’s national legislature must be composed of
representatives of at least 50 percent blood quantum, acknowledging that
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federal entitlements like the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act have failed
the majority of Hawaiians who qualified (Ka Lhui 1987, 15). It is telling
that from its inception in 1987, Ka Lhui sought to protect those who had
been promised land by the United States and who never received it, even
though this policy risked political divisions within the organization itself.
The fact that Ka Lhui has shown remarkable endurance may indicate
that blood quantum discrimination is acceptable to Hawaiians so long as
the government means well by it. But it is difficult to convince Americans
and their Supreme Court that not every culture has had such a violent and
ugly experience with race that it is necessary to pretend that it does not
exist in law.
Our conceptions of race and nationality are drawn by our own past,
and obscured by our historic relationships with Americans. For it was
Americans who began the religious conversions, wrote the first constitu-
tions, built and enlarged the plantation systems, and, when they no longer
needed it, replaced the Native government with their own. Political, eco-
nomic, and social change have been the legacies of our two-hundred-year
history with the United States, though as Hawaiians we have changed dif-
f e re n t ly—as diff e rently as our genetic inheritances have changed with each
foreign addition to our families. Some of us have been more “successful”
at assimilating American culture and values, some more successful at liv-
ing with the differences. Some have refused to assimilate, and others have
suffered great harm by their own confusion over assimilation.
Perhaps, as Fields asserted, race itself has nothing to do with how we
have accommodated American culture and a Hawaiian-Portuguese is no
more likely to assimilate in a particular way than a Hawaiian-Chinese.
Yet, race definitely matters to us. It is important to us that we are, in the
first place, Hawaiian. Moreover, our attitudes toward haole have not
really changed all that much over time. We were ambivalent about them
in the nineteenth century and we remain so today. We allowed them to live
here, prosper, and even rule us, but we always recognized that they were
not Hawaiians. 
“I Call You the Angel of Deat h ”
On 26 July 1887, Hawaiian voters in Honolulu held a meeting to nomi-
nate candidates for a new and very different sort of legislature. Such ral-
lies had become a regular and cyclical part of political life for Knaka
Maoli since the 1840s, when constitutional law created the right of the
people to select members of the House of Representatives. But this meet-
366 the con t e mpor a ry pacific • fall 2001
ing was different. For the first time, knaka faced the very certain pros-
pect of having the Legislative Assembly dominated by haole nobles and
representatives who were hostile to their king and, they believed, hostile
to the kingdom’s independence.
This election departed from the established rhythms and rules of elec-
tions that had been held every even year in the month of February since
1856. A constitution forced on the king earlier in July had expelled the
1886 legislature, rendered the king nearly impotent, and drastically
redefined the electorate and the meaning of citizenship. The genesis of this
constitution was as disturbing as its provisions. It had been invented in
secrecy by a covert organization of haole men who, the knaka believed,
had not only confiscated the power of the government for themselves, but
had soiled the meaning of nationhood for Native Hawaiians. It became
known as the Bayonet Constitution.
It was a perplexing time. The new laws hopelessly entangled issues of
race, which had not existed before the arrival of haole, and issues of class,
which had been greatly transformed by haole economic success. The con-
stitution converted the House of Nobles from a council of the king’s
appointees and the remnants of the great ali‘i lineages to a special leg-
islative branch of, by, and for the wealthy. The House of Representatives
no longer represented the native-born and naturalized citizen, but was
expanded to include any Caucasian resident, even as the law limited vot-
ing only to knaka who were willing to swear allegiance to the consti-
tution, while terminating the voting rights of over four hundred Asian
citizens. The mÔ (king), once the supreme political authority and last
fortress of political power for the knaka, was reduced to a mere figure-
head, signifying a further loss of Native prestige. 
The new constitution was executed by force. Supported by the Hono-
lulu Rifles, a paramilitary force of over four hundred men, a small delega-
tion of the most malevolent opponents of King Kalkaua threatened and
browbeat him for several hours before he finally signed the law. The king
was alone, having dismissed his prime minister and his cabinet only a few
days before. He took that action after months of heated criticism by a
small but well-connected group of haole who had formed themselves into
the secret organization that called itself the Hawaiian League. Unhappy
with the king’s administration and its policies, unhappy with monarchy,
unhappy even that Hawaiians simply showed no apparent desire to
become Americans, the league was determined minimally to replace Kal-
kaua’s ministry and ultimately to secure annexation by the United States.
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The king was alone. That fact said volumes about the political divisions
in Hawaiian society that had existed from the moment he had ascended to
the kingship thirteen years before. Then a large group of Native Hawai-
ians had opposed his selection, by the Legislative Assembly, over Emma
Naea Rooke, a descendant of the Kamehameha line and widow of former
MÔ Alexander Liholiho, Kamehameha IV. Over the next few years,
knaka had divided politically over their positions with respect to the
king, his policies, his advisers, and his ideas. But their opposition to him
was complicated by the fact that many haole, especially Americans, did
not distinguish between their dislike of Kalkaua and their contempt for
monarchs in general, Native monarchs in particular, and Native voters
altogether.
Highly respected legislators such as Joseph Nwah and George Pilip,
supporters of Queen Emma, had led such vigorous opposition to the king
that leaders of a new Independent party, led by Hawai‘i-born haole had
invited several of them to run for the Assembly on their ballot, insisting
that the only way for the Native opposition to hope to match the king’s
influence over the legislature was to ally itself with haole voters and their
resources.
Having knaka join the party was also the only way for the Indepen-
dents to establish any real political success, as knaka voters loyal to the
king outnumbered them many times over. Had Kalkaua enjoyed the uni-
versal Native support that all of his predecessors had known, the Inde-
pendent party could hardly have existed at all. But he had never had this
support, and steadily mounting attacks in the newspapers on his policies
and his alleged corruptions had compromised his leadership. Some
Hawaiians, like Nwah, believed that such a king, unchecked by a legit-
imate party of opposition, would squander the nation’s wealth and guar-
antee the loss of its sovereignty. But far more knaka suspected the Inde-
pendent haole of wanting to establish a republic, or worse, give the
kingdom away to America.
All of these k  n a k a w e re patriots. But their political disagreements over
the king began to overshadow their sense of kinship with the lhui. In the
aftermath of the Bayonet Constitution, it was difficult for knaka politi-
cians and their supporters to know how to meet the challenges it posed.
Several individuals and organizations quickly petitioned the king to
reverse the situation and reinstate the old constitution. He refused. So the
meeting in Honolulu was hostile and uneasy. Samuel Kane, a candidate
for representative who opposed the new law, was nevertheless uncertain
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about how to overturn it. “We have not yet signed it,” he said, referring
to the required oath of allegiance. “If we do not take the oath, of course,
we cannot vote. But in this perilous time we are under obligation to take
oath under it. No matter if we agree with it or not, we shall have a major-
ity on our side, and then we will be able to change it.”
But A P Kalaukoa, a perennial candidate for more than a decade and
unelected since 1876, made the most forceful arguments for the new con-
stitution in the face of an overwhelmingly unfriendly audience. After
recounting the merits of the new law, he asked what he hoped was a rhe-
torical question, “Now tell me, have any of you been endangered by this
new constitution?” “Nui ka Pilikia” (We are greatly oppressed), the cro w d
ro a red back. The next speaker, Honolulu attorney Joseph Poepoe, re c a l l e d
Kalaukoa’s remarks and said, “I call you the angel of death.” Then, he
spoke about the nation and its regard for its king, reminding the audience
of the importance of the king to the Native identity and how that distin-
guished them from haole. “The Americans have no respect for royalty, for
they have no king. Therefore, they want to exercise the same power here
as they do in their own country. They are doing it little by little, and it
will not be long before Hawai‘i becomes an entire republic. We who cher-
ish our King ought not to allow this to be done” (P C A, 26 July 1887,
“Mass Meeting in Honolulu”).
Confusion and unease over what should be done to maintain a tenuous
foothold in their kingdom’s political future dominated these rallies. They
disagreed over strategies, they proposed alliances, but mostly they argued
heatedly over whether they should take the oath, thus allowing them to
vote and run for office. In the end, thousands of knaka loyalists refused
to vote in September, guaranteeing that the Independent party, now call-
ing itself the Reform party, would control the government for the fore-
seeable future. Former Independents, particularly Nawahi, enlisted new
political parties opposing the Bayonet Constitution, haole control, and
annexation. By 1892 there were several Native-led parties with platforms
ranging from restoring the old constitution to establishing a republic in
which the knaka voters would recover their political majority.
Their opposition to one another overshadowed the central truth that
they all wanted only to pre s e rve the sovereignty of the l  h u i . Thus divided,
they presented no serious threat to haole control until Kalkaua died and
his sister, the respected Ali‘i Nui Lili‘uokalani replaced him in 1892. Less
than a year later, the queen attempted to promulgate a new constitution,
closely based on the pre-1887 law. Faced with this threat to their inter-
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ests, a small group of haole, incited by the same individuals who had con-
structed the Bayonet Constitution, appealed to the US delegation in
Hawai‘i and the commander of the warship USS Boston to help them do
away with the monarchy once and for all.
A MO‘O L E L O of Law and Rac e
This is the mo‘olelo. In English, mo‘olelo translates as history, story, tale,
folktale, account. Literally, it means a fragment of a story, as though the
teller recognizes that he is not saying everything there is to say about the
subject. I cannot pretend to say everything there is to say about the Bay-
onet Constitution; indeed, in this mo‘olelo I can only reveal a fraction of
what I know.5 But all that I know is only a small part of the truth that I
do not know. Was the king as corrupt as the newspapers and his political
opponents alleged? Were Nwah and other knaka Independents aware
of the existence of the Hawaiian League and its agendas before it took
over the government? What were Kalaukoa’s thoughts as he addressed the
rally in July? Was he trying to deceive his people, securing haole support
for his election by sowing doubt and disunity among the knaka? Was he
courageously risking his reputation by appealing to the Natives to make
the best of the situation and maintain at least a semblance of representa-
tion in the Assembly? Perhaps he was just a fool. 
There are things that I know, thanks in large part to other people’s
mo‘olelo. One is that knaka were, in fact, seriously injured by the pro-
visions of the Bayonet Constitution. Despite having a seven-to-one ratio
over British and American citizens and residents and more than double the
population of all Caucasians including recently arrived Portuguese immi-
grants, knaka could not, if they had cared to, translate their numerical
superiority in the general population into political control of the Assem-
bly (Earle 1993).
In the democratic society that Hawai‘i had been before Bayonet, the
government was simply not given the option of discriminating among
subjects. Even under the liberal laws of the kingdom, Native voters and
monarchs could have used their electoral majority and consigned haole to
an insignificant minority in the legislature and refused to appoint them to
positions of authority. They never had. 
In 1886 the Independents’ vicious attacks on the king prompted one
newspaper sympathetic to the Crown to proclaim, “If a single native
votes for a candidate on the Opposition ticket he is attacking the indepen-
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dence of the country and signing away to strangers the graves and bones
of his fathers. There is no middle ground to take” (P CA, 2 2 J a n u a ry 1 8 8 6) .
Despite having lost three seats to the loyalists, none of the Independents
was haole. Even the great Nwah was narrowly defeated, and haole leg-
islators were as overrepresented as ever. Of the 28 representatives elected
in 1886, 10 were haole, almost 36 percent. Combined with the 18 haole
in the House of Nobles (compared to only 8 knaka) Caucasians of Brit-
ish, German, and American origins occupied 51 percent of the Legislative
Assembly.
What does it mean that Native voters refused to use their legal advan-
tage to limit haole influence and that haole were willing to use force to
change the law in order to enhance theirs? I think it means that Hawai-
ians believed that the law meant more than mere political opportunism.
I think that in the short time that Hawaiians had lived in a nation gov-
erned by laws, they had come to appreciate their authority and signifi-
cance. Their laws had allowed knaka, Chinese, and haole subjects to live
together despite their considerable differences and suspicions, and that
was a powerful and venerable authority indeed. As for the authors and
supporters of the Bayonet Constitution, their principal symbol of nation-
hood was not law. It was race.
The constitutional changes of Bayonet were as much about race as they
were about removing the power and prestige of the Native monarch.
American residents in Hawai‘i linked the inferiority of Knaka Maoli to
their willingness to support monarchy in the first place. Missionary scion
William R Castle, remembering Bayonet, wrote, “It was in vain to explain
the principles of constitutional government to the aroused and jealous
supporters of Kalkaua; it was only adding fuel to the fire to warn them
that the inevitable result must be loss of independence, because the indus-
tries of this country, largely controlled by foreigners, would never consent
to be taxed and exploited by the acts of an irresponsible ruling class.”
For knaka to vote in 1887, therefore, would first require that they dis-
avow their loyalty to the king, though technically an emasculated monar-
chy would continue to exist. At the same time, virtually any Caucasian
was given the right to vote without the requirement of citizenship, or for
that matter, any experience with life in Hawai‘i. Thus, Bayonet instructed
the Native that a newly arrived Portuguese immigrant had as much legit-
imacy as a second- or third-generation Native Hawaiian voter. But the
more disturbing lesson of this law for Hawaiians was that a constitution
could annihilate, in the name of political opportunism, the most funda-
mental ideals of national loyalty. Bayonet became the latest and most
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deadly of the political maneuvers and legal creations designed by haole to
increase their authority and their prosperity in the islands, while dimin-
ishing the dignity of the lhui.
Having the choice of whether or not to cooperate with the foreigners’
law fragmented the lhui, creating an angry and uncertain gathering
unable to mount anything close to an effective resistance. Divided as it
was, however, the only response that Native leaders could advance that
evening was a response not to the men and groups of men who had per-
formed this despicable deed, but to the law itself. Their acquiescence to
law was never in doubt, as men like Kane argued that not to pledge alle-
giance to the constitution would render them politically impotent. No one
suggested, at least within earshot of a reporter, that the thousands of men
in attendance march to the homes of Thurston, Dole, Smith, Ashford, and
other members of the new ministry, haul them from their homes, and send
them out of the islands on the first boat.
The law was bigger than all of them, bigger than the king and stronger
than all of his supporters and opponents. The law had superseded the
nation itself. Nothing that any of them brought to bear in the struggle—
their lineages, their enormous talents, their courage, not even their num-
bers and their loyalty to each other—was a match for the law. Indeed the
law enabled their talents, courage, and loyalties to work against them as
a people, helping to frame them as political parties while eroding their
historic kinship with one another. They were marginalized, thrust to the
edges of political discourse, while the constitution, this foreign idea, took
hold of the center of the controversies it had created.
This law created controversy and in the same moment institutionalized
racism, specifically disenfranchising Asian, mostly Chinese, subjects. In
every constitution before Bayonet, race and nationality were separate and
distinct issues. Citizenship, whether inherited or conferred by oath, had
never before been denied on the basis of race. The haole constitution inte-
grated the two in ways designed to give haole a distinct political advan-
tage. Here I return to Field’s analysis, in which she describes race ideolo-
gies born after the laws, which defined the free and unfree in colonial
America. She wrote, “Practical needs—the need to clarify the property
rights of slave holders and the need to discourage free people from frat-
ernizing with slaves—called forth the law. And once practical needs of
this sort are ritualized often enough either as conforming behavior or pun-
ishment for non conforming behavior, they acquire an ideological ratio-
nale that explains to those who take part in the ritual why it is automatic
and natural to do so” (1990, 107–108).
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Racism had been neither automatic nor natural for the knaka in the
kingdom. But that is not to say that they were unconscious or unaware
that foreigners were different. In the 1840s thousands of knaka had
signed petitions to the king and the legislature, begging the government
not to allow foreigners to become citizens, be allowed political power, o r
be granted land.6 When the kingdom denied the petitions of the people
and granted foreigners the right to own land, to take oaths of citizenship,
and to participate in government, they granted these rights under the law.
Did the law presage the people’s eventual accommodation of haole, or
simply sidestep the argument over their difference? 
I think it was the latter. What knaka felt about haole is hard to estab-
lish d e fi n i t i v e l y. One of the recipients of the petitions was Minister of Inte-
rior Keoniana, the son of a Native Chiefess of considerable rank and the
Englishman John Young. There is no evidence anywhere to suggest that
k  n a k a held this man in contempt because he was only 50 p e rcent Native.
It was more important to them that he was a chief, and a child of the
Kamehameha line. In fact, less than thirty years later, thousands of k  n a k a
would violently demonstrate their preference for Queen Emma, John
Young’s granddaughter, over David Kalkaua because Emma’s grand-
mother was a Kamehameha.
K  n a k a voted h a o l e into office, gave and sold them lands, married them
and loved their children, relied on them, praised them, criticized their arro-
gance, and deplored their tre a c h e ry. Accommodation of h a o l e was varied
and individualized. The law could enable foreigners to make homes in
Hawai‘i—and fortunes besides—but it could not and did not make them
Native.
A MO‘O L E L O of Nat i o n h o o d
A proper mo‘olelo delivers lessons from the past that are intended to
guide our present behavior. We are still divided, the Knaka Maoli of the
twenty-first century, over what should be our political future after a hun-
d red years of American occupation. When federal re p resentatives from the
D e p a rtment of the Interior came to Hawai‘i late in the year 2 0 0 0 to gather
testimony and proposals from knaka on how reconciliation between the
United States and the Hawaiian people might be effected, Knaka Maoli
turned up by the hundreds at every one of their appearances and treated
the delegation to generations of frustration, calling for every conceivable
kind of redress: monetary reparations, more aid for education and health,
the re t u rn of lands and federal recognition, independence, and re s t o r a t i o n
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of the kingdom. It became obvious that we were not so much speaking to
the American delegation as speaking to ourselves, contending over the cen-
tral problem that had underwritten our loss of sovereignty in the first
place. How do we protect our l  h u i , our kinship with one another? Do we
conform our responses to the framework of the American political sys-
tem, hoping that we might bring new benefits to our children thereby, or
do we insist on clinging to every tradition that we can re c o v e r, insisting on
our separateness, our distinctness, from a society that seemingly regards
such distinction as anachronistic and dangerous?
Some of us fear that the second option marginalizes us, and that fear
itself is troubling. It is as though we have come to believe that we are the
ones living on the edges of American life, the center of which contains the
t rue and legitimate criteria for our existence. Though we send our childre n
to immersion schools, we worry when they score poorly in standardized
English examinations. Though we demand self-government, those of us
who believe that to be an unrealistic dream often scorn the proponents of
complete independence.
Yet when we consider the first option, we realize that American law is
no more reliable a friend to the Native Hawaiian at the dawn of this cen-
tury than it was at the turn of the last. As the US Supreme Court delib-
erated Rice versus Cayetano, Hawaiians feared that the decision could
initiate a trend to divest the Knaka Maoli of other “entitlements”—the
Ceded Lands Trust, Hawaiian Home Lands, the Native Hawaiian Educa-
tion Act—or even challenge the Hawaiians-first admission policy of the
Kamehameha Schools. These federal, state, and private programs repre-
sent some of the few hedges against massive poverty and homelessness. 
Knowing this, understanding what is at stake, we still find it difficult
to wholeheartedly support the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, an agency that
many of us feel has not always behaved honorably and whose factions
and intrigues have encouraged those who oppose Native self-government.
It would be a considerable distortion to compare the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs with Kalkaua’s administration in 1886, but the lessons are simi-
l a r. Lacking confidence in our leaders and in our own institutions, we look
hesitantly to law to provide us relief and perhaps, to finally legitimize us
as a nation.
But if law could not make haole into Natives in the nineteenth century,
then perhaps it cannot make Knaka Maoli into Americans. I think both
Fields and Kauanui would agree that while law constructs and alters ide-
ologies, it does so primarily by mediating (or confusing) the essential
qualities of cultural identity in order to promote a particular political
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end. National consciousness, loyalty, and patriotism were never merely
the product of laws. They were, like culture itself, the weaving of many
strands of understandings and behaviors.
Thus, I doubt that laws alone can ever really protect such identities.
Our culture—any culture—is far too vast, too complex, too imprecise a
m i x t u re of ancestry, values, languages, and rituals for the precision of laws
to comfortably address. The US Supreme Court’s very limited opinion
shies away from any statement at all on the relationship between Hawai-
ians and America. Yet the US Congress may, through a bill for Federal
Recognition, go where the court has refused to go. Recognition may bring
a host of economic and political benefits, but it will almost certainly
involve identifying Native Hawaiians and place limits on our “resources”
by some sort of legal formula that has yet to be clarified.
I wonder how much more fragmentation we can endure? Hawaiians
who support full independence or restoration of the kingdom have been
generally polite in their criticism of Hawaiians who pursue federal recog-
nition, but there were explosive moments at the Federal Recognition hear-
ings in August 2 0 0 0 , when proponents of independence protested and
heckled Hawaiians who had come to speak in favor of the bill. Poepoe’s
words of frustration linger.
Few Hawaiians are naive about “Recognition and Reconciliation.” We
know that this is part of a political deal. But we are wrong if we think the
effects of this deal can be confined to the political. We will not simply sur-
render a portion of our lands in the negotiations with the government, nor
will we surrender only the scope of our sovereignty. We are surrendering
something far more important, faith and trust in each other and our will-
ingness to continue working out our own kinship among ourselves.
Native people cannot look to American law to define Nativeness. Nei-
ther can we depend on political solutions alone to retrieve our l  h u i . T h e re
is really very little difference between the debates over federal recognition
today and cooperation with the Bayonet Constitution more than a cen-
tury ago. We have all been arguing over whether it is preferable to secure
political gains in small steps, or risk losing everything over a principle. In
the end, we argue over how best to protect and honor our integrity as a
people, and therein lies the only real fragmentation that plagues us. We
know that we are a distinct people that was once protected by its own
national government. We know that once that government was removed
t h e re was nothing to prevent the Americans from defining us however they
wished, and nothing to keep us Hawaiian except our own determination.
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Perhaps the most surprising development is how Hawaiian we still are.
‘Ae, even in the face of a most determined eff o rt to assimilate and quiet
us, we persist. Of our own volition we have freely and lovingly mixed our
a n c e s t ry with every available nationality. But the political solution for cre-
ating Americans of Hawaiians has failed to produce the desired “melting
pot” effect, that is, eradicating a Native Hawaiian identity. As Bayonet
i n s t ructs us, we have come to see that legal solutions usually mask expe-
dient ways for a few h a o l e to continue to control our lands and wealth.
This does not mean that there is no political solution to the control of
our lands. It means that there is no political solution to the fragmentation
of our identity as Native people short of reinstating the national govern-
ment. But even that will hardly create a lhui without our continued
effort to learn our history, speak our language, develop our arts, and
compete with one another for political leadership, while acknowledging
and glorying in what makes us different from other nations and their peo-
ples.
ÔAe. ÔOia ka nnau maoli (That is the real question). Who the hell are
we? If our own activism and scholarship does not continually seek the
answers to that question, then it is activism and scholarship for someone
else. Asking that question, by the way, does not only admit that colonial
assimilation has worked considerable harm on the Hawaiian people. Try-
ing to trace a distinct Native identity that has been strung out over a cen-
tury and a half of colonial conversions of all sorts, suggests that Knaka
Maoli have been disfigured in different ways. Not all have suffered eco-
n o m i c a l l y. Some have even pro s p e red. Nor has impoverishment meant the
same across the board. Poverty lessened the dignity of some of our people
and raised it in others. 
So we have changed. We make such admissions guardedly, knowing
what political ammunition this provides for those, like the governor, who
think we should simply act like other Americans. One wonders if he holds
the Center for Hawaiian Studies responsible for the nationalist expre s s i o n s
of our people, but we know that if anything, the opposite is true. We
Hawaiians have always held that we are unique, and in the last few years
we have encouraged our scholars, elders, and even our children to show
us how.
Unique. Yes. There is not another people in the world like us. But who,
exactly is “Us?” The problem of the blood quantum and its political con-
sequences resurfaces with every letter to the Advertiser. When one fre-
quent haole contributor argued that Knaka Maoli were “fully assimi-
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lated, happily interm a rr i e d,” and “indistinguishable from everyone else,”7
t h e re were angry responses, one in part i c u l ar, that argued the central point
of Hawaiian identity. “Hawaiians and only Hawaiians can decide who is
Hawaiian and who is not Hawaiian” (Ferreira 2000, A-11). Such logic
would resist the most well meaning of laws, and our experience tells us
how infrequently law, for Natives, has been well meaning.
But such logic defies “cultural studies” as well, unless we understand
that for Knaka Maoli, at least, studying our own culture is no mere aca-
demic exercise. We are trying to survive. Thus, even the best-intentioned
nonnative scholars can tell us little beyond how they perceive us. To have
others learn our language—better than we know it—and master our arts
and sciences is flattering and important. But others cannot tell us who we
are. We will always mediate and often contradict their findings with what
we know and what we feel. If the scientist is uncomfortable with this
caveat, I will simply repeat what I have said from the beginning of this
essay. Identity is no small matter for us.
To return to the moÔolelo, the problem for Kalaukoa and Poepoe was
not a problem of identity. Surely they knew who they were better than we
know ourselves after fifty years of television and a century of American
education. Surely they knew they were Hawaiian. Not one speaker on that
stage would for a moment have considered himself an American. Yet their
own culture had been changed by the experience of dealing with a west-
ern colonial hegemony. Their mÔ had been humiliated and they had
failed to protect him or the sanctity of their laws. They were suspicious of
one another and bitter that the haole had so successfully betrayed them.
N e v e rtheless, it would never have occurred to those men, living at the cusp
of a moment when their race, nationhood, and government were one and
the same, to ask the question, Who then, are we? Those of us in this cen-
tury who confront this question, confounded in ways that our ancestors
were not, can take nothing for granted, not even our Hawaiianness. That
too, is something we might cherish.
Notes
1 There is, however, some disagreement over the use of the word Hawaiian
to describe the aboriginal people and their descendants, especially since the word
itself is not part of the Native lexicon. Some people insist that Hawaiian denotes
mere residence rather than ancestry, like Californian or Texan. Others insist that
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whether we are called Hawaiian, Knaka Maoli, or Ôñiwi, we are referring to the
Native people of Hawai‘i.
2 A public discussion of the importance of ancestry has been taking place in
the editorial section of the Honolulu Advertiser since Freddy Rice first announced
his intention to challenge the Office of Hawaiian Affairs elections. Artist Peter
Charlot has sparked the most recent exchange, arguing that “a particular string
of genetic letters does not make a Hawaiian” (Honolulu Advertiser, 16 June
2000,A-19).
3 My father, who is half-Hawaiian has never applied for Hawaiian home
lands, in large part out of anxiety that the intense scrutiny of the Department of
Hawaiian Home Lands might possibly determine that my grandmother was not
a full-blooded Hawaiian and thus alter his own conception of himself. His iden-
tity is worth more to him than the land.
4 See Honolulu Advert i s e r, 1 4 May 2 0 0 0 , A - 1 4 . In one of a series of letters to
the editor sparked by Rice versus Cayetano, Mr Paul Silva wrote, “Trust benefits
will likely be paid largely by those who have no Hawaiian blood for the benefit
of persons who essentially have so little Hawaiian blood that they can hardly be
considered indigenous.” 
5 See Osorio, 1996. A revised version is under review by the University of
Hawai‘i Press. Its working title is Dismembering Lhui: A History of the Dis-
mantling of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887. Anyone who wishes to read the dis-
sertation on which this book is based may locate it at Hamilton Library, Uni-
versity of Hawai‘i at Mnoa. 
6 Kame‘eleihiwa 1992, 193–197. The petitions are located in the Hawai‘i
State Archives.
7 Conklin 2000,A-9. Conklin has been writing similar letters and even short
editorials for more than a year, supporting Freddy Rice’s petition and arguing
against any Native entitlements whatsoever. The full text of his letter reads: “But
Knaka Maoli are not a separate and distinct people living apart from the rest of
the society like real Indian tribes. They do not have a tribal government exercis-
ing government authority over them like real Indian tribes. They do not want
these things. Knaka Maoli are fully assimilated, happily intermarried, living and
working side by side with everyone else. They are everyone else.”
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Abstract
In the summer of 1887 a small group of conspirators re p resenting about five hun-
d red mostly Caucasian residents and citizens of the Hawaiian Kingdom forced
King David Kalkaua to sign a new constitution of their own design that explic-
itly humiliated him and the largely Native Hawaiian electorate. In the political
rallies that followed, Natives who supported the new constitution and who
exhorted Hawaiians to rally around it were ridiculed by opponents, who never-
theless were often divided over whether to boycott the coming elections or to try
and take over the government through the vote and remove the most egregious
clauses from the constitution. As the recent reconciliation hearings in Hawai‘i
have demonstrated, the tension between participating in practical politics and
nurturing a defiant national spirit persists today and continues to afflict and
enliven the issues of nationhood and identity.
k e y wo r d s: cultural studies, decolonization, Hawaiian history, Hawaiian sov-
ereignty, Pacific studies
